Internet routing measurements: from theory to practice

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# Short bio



PhD@EURECOM Sophia-Antipolis (2011 - 2015)



Internet routing & security

- measurements, systems Ο
- data science

Ο

web data, ML/AI research Ο

INSTITUTE OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

FORTH, Heraklion


(2015 - 2019)

#### The Internet

#### The Internet (routing) is a ... ?


- A. mesh
- B.) mess
- C. well modeled and analyzed system


#### The Internet





- The Internet is a network of networks or "Autonomous Systems (AS)"
- ~70k ASes
- ~450k AS-AS links ("peering links")


#### The Internet












# Internet routing measurements


#### **Characteristics**

	Information type	Measurement type	Vantage points
BGP route collectors	path	passive (monitoring)	public monitors
<ul> <li>Pings</li> </ul>	reachability	active	public monitors & local (my network)
Traceroutes	reachability & path	active	public monitors & local (my network)


#### BGP route collectors



#### Ping measurements



#### Traceroute measurements




# Use cases / problems

#### 1. Network management ("catchment" inference)

#### 2. Network security (BGP prefix hijacking)

#### Catchment



### Importance of catchment

Knowing / inferring / predicting the catchment is important for:

#### • load balancing & traffic engineering

• e.g., "how to announce my IP addresses through BGP so that each of the ingress points A and B receives 50% of the incoming traffic?"

#### • network planning & resource allocation

• e.g., "where to deploy/connect a new ingress point so that it attracts the incoming traffic from US-based ASes?"


#### • resilience analysis

- e.g., "how would a BGP hijack by AS\_x or failure of a link Y affect my traffic?"
- etc.

## Problem: What is my "catchment"?

#### A fundamental problem in Internet routing operations:

A network <u>cannot</u> fully *control* or even *know* exactly the catchment of its ingress points!



Why? Because the catchment depends on the...


- <u>routing configuration</u> (set of ingress points, BGP announcement fields, etc.)
- <u>local routing policies of all ASes</u>  $\rightarrow$  which are not accurately known
- <u>topology & BGP dynamics</u>  $\rightarrow$  which are highly complex

# Existing approaches

What do network operators do today to estimate / infer / predict the catchment?

#### Measurements!

• existing methodologies: measure all (~70k) networks  $\rightarrow$  naive, inefficient, non-scalable



### Can we do better?

#### • Goals


- infer catchment with less (or no) measurements
- propose efficient measurement methodologies
- prediction even for non existing deployments
- **How?** exploit information:
  - Topology: ASes and links  $\rightarrow$  we (mostly) know it
  - Routing policies  $\rightarrow$  we have only partial/inaccurate information
  - Local policies (i.e., "my network" / ingress points)  $\rightarrow$  we know it

more complete & accurate data → more informative our inference

Pavlos Sermpezis and Vasileios Kotronis,. "Inferring Catchment in Internet Routing", ACM SIGMETRICS, 2019.


## Let's start: all paths, eligible paths, best paths

- all possible BGP paths of n1:  $[dst \rightarrow ... \rightarrow n1]$
- eligible paths of n1:  $[dst \rightarrow n2 \rightarrow n1]$  and  $[dst \rightarrow n3 \rightarrow n1]$ 
  - $[dst \rightarrow n4 \rightarrow n1]$  is **not** eligible, because  $q_{12}, q_{13} > q_{14}$  (i.e., not preferred as best path)
- best path of n1 ?
  - best path == catchment inference




# Inference, step 0: build the R-graph

• The **R-graph** is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that encodes all the eligible paths



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#### Algorithm 1 (R-graph construction)


- Simulate BGP, arbitrarily break ties (this randomness does *not* affect the R-graph construction!)
- FOR each node, add incoming edges from all neighbors: (i) from which a path is learned, <u>and</u> (ii) have the highest local preference

#### **Theorem 1**

A path  $p_{i \rightarrow dst} = [dst \rightarrow ... \rightarrow i]$  is an eligible path <u>if and only if</u> it can be constructed by starting from node *dst* and following a sequence of directed edges in the R-graph until reaching node *i* 

- The R-graph ...
  - ... encodes all the eligible paths
  - ... enables catchment inference

(i.e., infer through which ingress point each node *i* routes its traffic to node *dst*)




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
#### Algorithm 2 (certain inference on the R-graph)

• IF <u>only one eligible path</u>  $\rightarrow$  inference *e.g.*, nodes n1, n2, n3, n5



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


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
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
- IF <u>only one eligible path</u> → inference e.g,. nodes n1, n2, n3, n5
- IF multiple eligible paths
  - IF all paths through the same ingress point  $\rightarrow$  inference *e.g., node n7*
  - $\circ \quad \mathsf{ELSE} \to \mathsf{no} \ \mathsf{certain} \ \mathsf{inference}$ 
    - e.g., nodes n4, n6, n8



- The R-graph ...
  - ... encodes all the eligible paths
  - ... enables catchment inference

(i.e., infer through which ingress point each node *i* routes its traffic to node *dst*)





n8

n5

n6


n2

**n7** 

**n1** 

n3

- *"route probability"* π<sub>i</sub>(m): probability the best path of node *i* to be through the ingress point m
  - e.g.,  $\pi_{n4}$  (red) = ?,  $\pi_{n4}$  (blue) = ?




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#### Algorithm 3 (probabilistic inference on the R-graph)


- FOR *node i* in topological\_sort(R-graph)
  - calculate probability from parent nodes **C**<sub>i</sub>

$$\pi_i(m) = \sum_{j \in C_i} \pi_j(m) \cdot \frac{1}{|C_i|}$$



*"route probability"* π<sub>i</sub>(m): probability the best path of node *i* to be through the ingress point m

• e.g.,  $\pi_{n4}(red) = ?$ ,  $\pi_{n4}(blue) = ?$ 



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
$$\pi_i(m) = \sum_{j \in C_i} \pi_j(m) \cdot \frac{1}{|C_i|}$$




• node n4: 
$$\pi_{n4}(red) = 1/2$$
,  $\pi_{n4}(blue) = 1/2$ 

• node n6: 
$$\pi_{n6}$$
 (red) = 1/2,  $\pi_{n6}$  (blue) = 1/2

• node n8: 
$$\pi_{n8}(red) = 1/4$$
,  $\pi_{n8}(blue) = 3/4/$ 




- oracle = measurement (e.g., BGP route collector, traceroute, etc.)
- Goal: <u>measure</u> a set of nodes  $S \rightarrow infer$  the catchment for  $S' \supseteq S$ ?
- more efficient measurement strategies



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#### Algorithm 4 (enhance inference under oracles)

• for a set of nodes **S**, measure ("infer from oracle") their routes




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
#### Algorithm 4 (enhance inference under oracles)

- for a set of nodes **S**, measure ("infer from oracle") their routes
- Iteratively
  - $\circ$  infer the routes of the <u>children-nodes</u> of nodes in **S** 
    - e.g., measure node **n6**


if **n6=blue**  $\rightarrow$  **n8=blue** if **n6=red**  $\rightarrow$  no inference for **n8** 



- oracle = measurement (e.g., BGP route collector, traceroute, etc.)
- Goal: <u>measure</u> a set of nodes  $S \rightarrow infer$  the catchment for  $S' \supseteq S$ ?
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


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- Goal: <u>measure</u> a set of nodes  $S \rightarrow infer$  the catchment for  $S' \supseteq S$ ?
- more efficient measurement strategies



## Efficient measurement strategies

- Optimal measurement strategy → NP-hard problem
  - combinatorial; without "nice properties" (e.g., submodularity)
  - even updating probabilities under oracles is NP-hard
     ("belief updating" in non-polytree Bayesian Networks; reduction to SAT)
- Heuristic (greedy) algorithm
  - at each step select measurement that increases most the certain inference
  - update probabilities only from *forward* belief propagation






Figure 3 R-graph based heuristic (black) vs. random measurements (red)

# More results (in the paper)

#### • rich information from inference

- upper/lower bounds, mean values, important links/nodes/policies
- completeness of inference
- efficiency of existing monitoring infrastructure
  - RouteViews, RIPE, LGs, etc.

#### • real experiments


- accuracy (vs. real-world measurements for IP anycasting)
- traffic engineering (vs. real-world peering selection)

# Use cases / problems


### 1. Network management ("catchment" inference)

### 2. Network security (BGP prefix hijacking)

# **BGP Prefix hijacking**



# **BGP Prefix hijacking**



## Importance of BGP prefix hijacking

#### • service outages & traffic interception

- can last for hours
- affect millions of users
- can cost 100s of thousands of \$\$\$ (or more) per minute
- ~2500 (reported) prefix hijacking events in 2020
- no actual (proactive) defence
  - *defences based upon detection & countermeasures*
  - timely detection is very important

# **BGP** prefix hijacking

#### • Detection

 $\circ$  our contribution  $\rightarrow$  near real time detection (within a few seconds; ~5sec.)

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking within a Minute", in ACM/IEEE Transactions on Networking (ToN), 2018.

in collaboration with



#### • Impact estimation

- *impact == catchment of the hijacker*
- $\circ$  our contribution  $\rightarrow$  1st formal study on hijack impact estimation

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "Estimating the Impact of BGP Prefix Hijacking", in IFIP Networking conference, June 2021.


### **Detection with ARTEMIS**

#### • "ARTEMIS"

• real-time detection & automated mitigation system

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking within a Minute", in ACM/IEEE Transactions on Networking (ToN), 2018.

### **Detection with ARTEMIS**



### **Detection with ARTEMIS**

#### • "ARTEMIS"

- real-time detection & automated mitigation system
- open-source software https://bgpartemis.org/
- deployed in operational networks
  - Internet2, AMS-IX, ForthNet, etc.

#### • Public monitoring infrastructure (BGP route collectors)

- became real-time only recently (3-4 years)
- rich information (will become richer with BMP protocol)
- enables novel applications/methods (research & commercial)

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking within a Minute", in ACM/IEEE Transactions on Networking (ToN), 2018.

### Impact estimation

#### • Goal: estimate the impact of a (detected) hijacking event

- detection (at least one network infected) vs.
   impact estimation (number of infected networks)
- *desired characteristics: fast & accurate methodology*

#### • How?

- Heavyweight methodology: measure all networks [NOW]
  - e.g., ping all networks
- Lightweight methodology: measure some networks (sampling)
  - e.g., estimate from BGP route collectors [NOW?]
  - e.g., ping some networks

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "Estimating the Impact of BGP Prefix Hijacking", in IFIP Networking conference, June 2021.


### Impact estimation

#### • Sampling in theory...

• The estimation error (RMSE) decreases with the number of samples (M)

**Theorem 1.** Under a randomly selected set of monitors  $\mathcal{M}$ , the bias and root mean square error of NIE are given by

 $Bias_{NIE} = 0 \qquad RMSE_{NIE} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{M}} \cdot c_I$ where  $c_I = \int_0^1 \sqrt{I \cdot (1-I)} \cdot f(I) \cdot dI$ , is a constant that depends on the impact distribution f(I).



- Sampling in practice...
  - with BGP route collectors

- with ping measurements
  - $\rightarrow$  high measurement failures (> 90% non pingable IP addresses)
  - $\rightarrow$  they end-up being less accurate than BGP route collectors (for **p** > 20%)
  - $\rightarrow$  we need *p* < 10%

**Theorem 2.** *RMSE vs. failure probability* **p.** 

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "Estimating the Impact of BGP Prefix Hijacking", in IFIP Networking conference, June 2021.

# (Practical) ping-based estimator

#### • Ping-based estimator:

- Find "pingable" IP addresses for every AS [ANT Lab's IP hitlist]
- Ping multiple  $(N_{\mu})$  IP addresses per AS
- If at least one ping reply from an AS  $\rightarrow$  the AS is not affected by the hijack

N <sub>IP</sub>	1	2	3	 10
p	12.8%	4.2%	2.1%	 0%
RMSE (M=100)	7.9%	4.7%	4.1%	 3.9%

#### Key findings

• 
$$N_{ID} >= 2$$
 for low error

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "Estimating the Impact of BGP Prefix Hijacking", in IFIP Networking conference, June 2021.

# (Improved) BGP route collectors estimator

- BGP route collectors estimator
  - high error, why?  $\rightarrow$  due to location bias, i.e., correlated measurements
  - how to improve?  $\rightarrow$  decouple them! ... with ML(?)

#### • ML-based estimator:

- many features (e.g., location information, routing policies, graph properties)
   & ML models (regression) worked fine in simulations!
- ... but, in practice?
  - no labelled real datasets :(
  - we did real experiments in the Internet  $\rightarrow$  ~20 labeled samples :/
  - most ML models did not train well in the few real experiments :(

**Result:** a *Linear (Ridge) Regressor* able to train well (20 samples!) and achieve low estimation error (even in experiments!)

Pavlos Sermpezis, et al. "Estimating the Impact of BGP Prefix Hijacking", in IFIP Networking conference, June 2021.

:)

# in collaboration with EPE

Pavlos Sermpezis | sermpezis@csd.auth.gr | Internet routing measurements: from theory to practice

### ML/AI for networking: challenges & research directions

**Data:** networking has a lot of useful data, but...

- lack of labelled data
- lack of benchmark datasets
- heterogeneous data (topology, routing paths, link state, text in mailing lists(!), etc.)


**Adoption:** ML/AI techniques can be very efficient, but...

- network operators/admins are not data scientists
- lack of transparency (i.e., trust issues; critical tasks)

**Methods:** general ML/AI methods may need to be adapted for networking problems...

- robustness
- cost function (high cost of errors)
- dynamic data
- capture network structure





# Summarizing...

#### Measurements

- very important in Internet operations (due to complexity and limited modeling)
- today: many capabilities & opportunities (new technologies)
- current methodologies: large potential for improvement

#### Theory vs. practice

- Only-theory: does not work
- Only-practice: inefficient, suboptimal
- Mix theory & practice: develop theory  $\rightarrow$  get insights  $\rightarrow$  apply in practice

#### **Future research directions**

- Data-science & ML/AI for networking (*e.g., AutoML, Explainable AI, Graph ML*)
- Key for feasibility and adoption: involve network operators in research

